22 Risk perception and communication

Definition of technical risk

Risk is formally defined as the product of the frequency by the consequence of a hazard. A hazard is an event that could lead to a loss or harm. Risk assessment is a means of analyzing complex systems for hazards but necessarily adapts as new technological systems emerge. Risk assessments evaluate hazards and ensuing, potential risk by addressing the following three questions [1] –

1. What can go wrong?
2. How likely will it happen?
3. What are the consequences?

Risk assessment tools often model multi-variate systems in an effort to characterize risk to a singular parameter or value that will facilitate comparisons. Often, risk assessment must assess characteristics which need to be considered simultaneously.When used early in system lifecycle, a preliminary risk assessment can offer design changes can be made to reduce risk or eliminate hazards altogether.

Perception of risk

However, technical approaches of risk really are not applicable when introducing new technologies to the public. The perception of risk will affect judgments and public opinion [2-4]. Over any population, the perception of risk will differ due to demographics, psychological traits, value orientations, and levels of knowledge [2].

Even though risk involves defining the frequency of a hazard; quite frankly, people really just are not going to be thinking about the frequency of hazards; i.e, probability neglect [5]. People then will perceive the risk of high consequence, low consequence events to be higher than the technical risk. Perception of risk among the public is largely derived from consequences associated with the technology. There may also be perceived benefits that will affect the level of acceptable risk. However, there likely will not be a such a straightforward correspondence, and most definitely, both the factors affecting perceived risks and potential benefits will vary widely across and within each community. Strong feelings of anxiety, dread, or nervousness typically result in a perception of high risk [6]. Part of this, could be a general lack of knowledge or lack of access to understanding a particular technology, as well as the degree of individual control; e.g., driving versus flying [2]. A key factor, therefore, is transparency and developing trust in experts to effectively communicate with the public.

Affect heuristic

The affect heuristic is critical in understanding risk perception. People will draw upon their affective reaction to assess their own level of risk or benefit [6]. The affect heuristic is more complex than just a feeling [7]. Many factors could contribute to a positive or negative affect for an individual; e.g., perceived knowledge, resistence to change, effects on friends and family. For example, building a new nuclear reactor could be viewed more beneficial due to creation of new jobs or negatively because there could be more traffic.

Non nuclear

New technologies carry a higher risk perception in contrast to traditional risk due to novelty and ambiguity [8]. Risks could be physical in terms of personal injury or invasions of privacy due to theft of personal data. This does not mean these technologies do not carry real risks. Notably, this commonly occurs with foods, where GMOs carry a higher perceived risk than ‘natural’ foods, although many of the latter contain chemicals or additives and the definition of ‘natural’ varies widely [9]. Drones, outside of military purposes, are also used for recreation, and more practical purposes – locating lost dogs [10]. Hazards are not unreasonable; e.g., crashing into a public area and causing physical harm [11]; yet, this actual frequency is low. However, the public perception of these risks can influence the formulation of regulations. Certainly, cyber risk is one of the highest public concerns. Here, the public perception is not that out of line with the actual risks, with numerous incidents across industries [12] and occurring with alarming regularity [13].

Nuclear

Public perception of risk in the nuclear fuel cycle stems from various factors and has ebbed and flowed over the decades; e.g., the ‘nuclear renaissance’. Nuclear energy will always have to overcome the ‘historical inertia’ stemming from the legacy of nuclear weapons [14]. In general, some of the risk perception originates from a lack of understanding of radiation [15]. Gamma-rays cannot be seen; a dose of 25 mrem does not have any tangible comparison. Arguably, Fukushima still affects current risk perceptions, resurfacing in 2023 with the release of tritiated water into the sea, even though concentrations are well below World Health Organization (WHO) standards [16].

The back-end of the fuel cycle poses an instructive example of risk perception. Neutron transport theory may not be well known by the public, but nuclear reactors producing electricity is a concept that can be seen and understood. There is far less knowledge in terms of the back end of the fuel cycle [15, 17]. Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is not seen, nor is there any media coverage because nothing happens to it. The actual volume of SNF, which, in reality, is comparatively low, is also not well known. SNF management and disposal is challenging because the default perception will be that there is a risk of radiation exposure or some unknown risk of SNF that may be passed on to the public [18, 19]. A nearly ubiquitous, and reasonable, question arises in any public discussion about nuclear energy – ‘What about the waste?’

Any technical risk assessment concludes that SNF can be managed effectively and with low risk. However, when engaging the public on consent, the perceived risk will dominate the discourse.

References

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4. Slovic, P., 1987. Perception of risk. Science 236, 280.
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15. Hayes, R. B., 2022. Nuclear energy myths versus facts support its expanded use – A review. Cleaner Energy Systems 2, 100009.
16. Reuters, 2023. Fukushima: Why is Japan releasing water and is it safe?
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18. Fox, A., et al., 2023. Exploring Public Discourse About Spent Nuclear Fuel Management on Twitter. Nuclear Technology, 10.1080/00295450.2023.2240185.
19. Gupta, K., et al., 2023. Consent-Based Siting of Spent Fuel Facilities: Evidence from Nationwide U.S. Surveys. Nuclear Technology, 10.1080/00295450.2023.2232647.